

“Responding to Criticism: Autocratic States and Treaty Reservation Withdrawal”

Appendix

Table A1 replicates the models presented in Table 1 of the primary manuscript while substituting the Polity2 measure of political regime type for the Electoral Democracy Index variable by V-Dem (Coppedge *et al.* 2018).

Table A1:

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Outcome Model: Explaining Reservation Withdrawal								
State Objections	-0.059* (0.027)	-0.054* (0.026)	-0.077* (0.028)	-0.072* (0.028)	.	.	.	.
Democracy	-0.696* (0.218)	-0.671* (0.218)	-0.437 (0.288)	-0.422 (0.286)	-1.005* (0.150)	-0.996* (0.158)	-0.843* (0.216)	-0.817* (0.213)
State Objections X Democracy	0.284* (0.074)	0.272* (0.073)	0.319* (0.077)	0.308* (0.076)	.	.	.	.
Periodic Review X Democracy	.	.	.	.	4.461* (0.389)	4.537* (0.399)	4.466* (0.393)	4.530* (0.399)
Demanding Treaty Provision	.	0.224* (0.111)	.	0.193 (0.115)	.	-0.067 (0.078)	.	-0.094 (0.076)
Non-derogable Treaty Provision	.	0.252 (0.226)	.	0.261 (0.234)	.	0.348* (0.144)	.	0.354* (0.144)
Judicial Independence	.	.	-0.091 (0.055)	-0.088 (0.054)	.	.	-0.024 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.038)
Treaties Equal or Superior	.	.	-0.463* (0.142)	-0.433* (0.142)	.	.	-0.245* (0.097)	-0.257* (0.096)
Constant	-0.829* (0.404)	-1.237* (0.400)	-0.593 (0.435)	-0.986* (0.448)	1.998* (0.086)	1.999* (0.103)	1.992* (0.099)	2.012* (0.111)
Selection Model: Explaining Reservations								
Civil Legal System	-0.510* (0.043)	-0.511* (0.043)	-0.507* (0.043)	-0.510* (0.043)	-0.405* (0.042)	-0.410* (0.043)	-0.406* (0.042)	-0.410* (0.042)
Islamic Legal System	0.040 (0.054)	0.037 (0.053)	0.045 (0.054)	0.041 (0.053)	0.153* (0.047)	0.144* (0.047)	0.154* (0.047)	0.147* (0.047)
Mixed Legal System	-0.389* (0.064)	-0.390* (0.064)	-0.387* (0.065)	-0.390* (0.064)	-0.323* (0.062)	-0.328* (0.062)	-0.323* (0.062)	-0.326* (0.062)
Democracy	0.063 (0.110)	0.053 (0.110)	0.076 (0.110)	0.071 (0.110)	0.230* (0.101)	0.222* (0.101)	0.212* (0.104)	0.205* (0.104)
Strong NHRI	-0.052* (0.004)	-0.052* (0.004)	-0.052* (0.004)	-0.052* (0.004)	-0.050* (0.004)	-0.050* (0.004)	-0.050* (0.004)	-0.050* (0.004)

Demanding Treaty Provision	0.215*	0.219*	0.217*	0.219*	0.201*	0.214*	0.197*	0.214*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Non-derogable Treaty Provision	0.030	0.037	0.031	0.036	0.107	0.017	0.108	0.017
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.079)
Judicial Independence	0.017	0.018	0.015	0.015	0.028	0.028	0.031	0.031
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Treaties Equal or Superior	0.131*	0.136*	0.123*	0.125*	0.047	0.047	0.083*	0.084*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Basic Rights Respected	0.069*	0.070*	0.069*	0.070*	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.034
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
GDP/cap (ln)	0.123*	0.124*	0.121*	0.122*	0.102*	0.103*	0.103*	0.104*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Population (ln)	0.144*	0.143*	0.145*	0.144*	0.140*	0.140*	0.140*	0.139*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	-5.344*	-5.334*	-5.348*	-5.338*	-5.239*	-5.243*	-5.246*	-5.245*
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.194)	(0.194)
Rho parameter	0.210	0.336*	0.117	0.233	-1.755*	-1.751*	-1.781*	-1.797*
	(0.160)	(0.167)	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.162)	(0.175)	(0.150)	(0.159)
Observations	51,755	51,755	51,755	51,755	51,755	51,755	51,755	51,755
Selected Observations	651	651	651	651	651	651	651	651
Non-selected Observations	51,104	51,104	51,104	51,104	51,104	51,104	51,104	51,104

* = p<.05; Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A1 replicates Figure 1 in the primary manuscript and presents the marginal effects of objections on reservation withdrawal at varying levels of the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index.

Figure A1: Marginal Effects of Peer Objections on Reservation Withdrawal, Based on Models 1-4 (L to R)




Figure A2 replicates Figure 2 in the primary manuscript and presents the marginal effects of peer objections on reservation withdrawal across levels of the electoral democracy index at varying levels of objections.

Figure A2: Marginal Effects of Objections on Reservation Withdrawals at Varying Levels of Democracy of the Reserving State




Figure A3 replicates Figure 3 from the primary manuscript and presents the marginal effects of periodic review on reservation withdrawal at varying levels of the electoral democracy index.

Figure A3: Marginal Effects of Periodic Review on Reservation Withdrawals at Varying Levels of Democracy of the Reserving State

