

# Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Matter for Ratification?

## Appendices

Suzie Mulesky  
Senior Behavioral Scientist  
Vanguard

Wayne Sandholtz (corresponding author)  
John A. McCone Chair in International Relations  
Department of Political Science and International Relations and  
Gould School of Law  
University of Southern California  
[wayne.sandholtz@usc.edu](mailto:wayne.sandholtz@usc.edu)

Kelebogile Zvobgo  
Government Department  
College of William & Mary

## **Appendix A: Regression Results and Robustness Checks**

Table A1: Demanding obligations and human rights treaty ratification, logistic regression, additional models

Ratification within 5 years

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Total requiring domestic action	1.002 (0.008)						
Total precise obligations		0.995 (0.009)					
Total strong obligations			0.987* (0.007)				
Demanding obligations				0.984** (0.007)	0.984** (0.007)	0.981** (0.007)	0.981** (0.007)
Democracy	1.333 (0.240)	1.311 (0.249)	1.300 (0.273)	1.545** (0.290)	1.807*** (0.413)	1.499* (0.311)	1.305 (0.285)
Democratic transition	1.705 (0.618)	1.731 (0.625)	1.841 (0.692)	1.310 (0.501)	1.104 (0.481)	1.735 (0.647)	1.870* (0.710)
Basic rights respected	0.822*** (0.054)	0.834*** (0.050)	0.841*** (0.051)		0.918 (0.058)	0.925 (0.058)	0.841*** (0.054)
IGO memberships (ln)	0.950 (0.150)	1.073 (0.187)	1.209 (0.203)			1.273 (0.214)	1.227 (0.201)
GDP/capita (ln)	1.318** (0.174)	1.321** (0.177)	1.331** (0.192)				1.337** (0.195)
Population (ln)							
Urban population (ln)							
Already ratified ICCPR							
Already ratified ICESCR							
Judicial independence							
After ICCPR but before end of Cold War							
Post Cold War period							
Constant				0.822 (0.329)	0.786 (0.337)	0.365 (0.234)	0.046** (0.058)
Observations	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,764	1,642	1,605	1,605
Log-likelihood	-1028	-1026	-990.3	-1098	-1016	-985.0	-975.5
$\chi^2$	17.41	21.40	20.05	11.98	12.81	15.54	23.13
$p > \chi^2$	0.0079	0.0016	0.0027	0.0075	0.0123	0.0083	0.0008

Odds ratios reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country and treaty in parentheses.

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table A1: Demanding obligations and human rights treaty ratification, logistic regression, additional models (continued)  
Ratification within 5 years

	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Total requiring domestic action							
Total precise obligations							
Total strong obligations							
Demanding obligations	0.981** (0.008)	0.981** (0.008)	0.980** (0.009)	0.975*** (0.006)	0.976*** (0.008)	0.981** (0.008)	0.972*** (0.010)
Democracy	1.192 (0.251)	1.158 (0.256)	1.424* (0.260)	1.457* (0.289)	1.589*** (0.285)	1.378 (0.450)	1.517** (0.257)
Democratic transition	2.100* (0.835)	2.145* (0.883)	1.570 (0.562)	1.582 (0.581)	1.277 (0.432)	1.682 (0.686)	1.370 (0.460)
Basic rights respected	0.971 (0.069)	1.039 (0.074)	0.824*** (0.050)	0.819*** (0.054)	0.815*** (0.051)	0.855** (0.059)	0.816*** (0.060)
IGO memberships (ln)	1.119 (0.189)	1.077 (0.176)	1.093 (0.163)	1.121 (0.161)	1.122 (0.163)	1.299 (0.232)	1.094 (0.129)
GDP/capita (ln)	1.288* (0.181)	1.138 (0.141)	1.260 (0.179)	1.278 (0.194)	1.229 (0.187)	1.324* (0.207)	1.233* (0.153)
Population (ln)	1.172** (0.090)						
Urban population (ln)		1.226*** (0.081)					
Already ratified ICCPR			1.859** (0.463)		2.079* (0.827)		
Already ratified ICESCR				1.436** (0.231)	0.679 (0.258)		
Judicial independence						0.797 (0.438)	
After ICCPR but before end of Cold War							4.276 (3.954)
Post Cold War period							6.325*** (3.371)
Constant	0.007** (0.014)	0.015*** (0.023)	0.089* (0.118)	0.109 (0.150)	0.150 (0.226)	0.044** (0.057)	0.051*** (0.052)
Observations	1,605	1,605	1,440	1,440	1,275	1,586	1,605
Log-likelihood	-965.7	-956.5	-887.6	-857.3	-776.9	-962.6	-911.0
$\chi^2$	30.62	48.83	21.35	29.82	23.82	23.81	33.47
$p > \chi^2$	0.0001	0.0000	0.0033	0.0001	0.0025	0.0012	0.0001

Odds ratios reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country and treaty in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table A2: Demanding obligations and treaty ratification, logistic regression

Ratification within 10 years

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Requiring domestic action	1.001 (0.009)							
Precise obligations		0.993 (0.009)						
Strong obligations			0.982*** (0.006)					
Demanding obligations				0.977*** (0.007)	0.981*** (0.006)	0.980*** (0.007)	0.979*** (0.007)	0.977*** (0.007)
Democracy	1.318 (0.239)	1.297 (0.247)	1.299 (0.283)	1.310 (0.298)	1.941* (0.708)	1.714*** (0.315)	1.760** (0.391)	1.455* (0.301)
Democracy X demanding obligations					0.991** (0.004)			
Democratic transition	1.153 (0.326)	1.175 (0.340)	1.239 (0.398)	1.247 (0.409)	1.123 (0.415)	0.859 (0.310)	0.764 (0.291)	1.181 (0.393)
Basic rights respected	0.922 (0.070)	0.937 (0.069)	0.950 (0.072)	0.951 (0.072)	0.950 (0.074)		1.011 (0.073)	1.020 (0.072)
IGO memberships (ln)	0.942 (0.171)	1.077 (0.210)	1.230 (0.231)	1.236 (0.228)	1.222 (0.218)			1.267 (0.231)
GDP/capita (ln)	1.219* (0.134)	1.224* (0.136)	1.237* (0.152)	1.242* (0.154)	1.241* (0.155)			
Population (ln)								
Urban population (ln)								
Already ratified ICCPR								
Already ratified ICESCR								
Judicial independence								
After ICCPR but before end of Cold War								
Post Cold War period								
Constant	0.234 (0.249)	0.251 (0.274)	0.199 (0.200)	0.189* (0.189)	0.174* (0.174)	1.799 (0.785)	1.852 (0.864)	0.896 (0.586)
Observations	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,764	1,642	1,605
ll	-1099.0	-1086.0	-1022.0	-1004.0	-1000.0	-1126.0	-1046.0	-1009.0
chi2	8.43	12.12	30.15	47.84	39.34	19.95	20.32	23.13
	0.2083	0.0593	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.0004	0.0003

Odds ratios reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country and treaty in parentheses.

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table A2: Demanding obligations and treaty ratification, logistic regression (continued)

Ratification within 10 years	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Requiring domestic action								
Precise obligations								
Strong obligations								
Demanding obligations	0.977*** (0.007)	0.977*** (0.007)	0.976*** (0.007)	0.975*** (0.008)	0.970*** (0.006)	0.970*** (0.007)	0.976*** (0.007)	0.967*** (0.009)
Democracy	1.310 (0.298)	1.181 (0.264)	1.157 (0.263)	1.387 (0.282)	1.451* (0.315)	1.556** (0.314)	1.361 (0.486)	1.489** (0.268)
Democracy X demanding obligations								
Democratic transition	1.247 (0.409)	1.437 (0.502)	1.442 (0.514)	1.128 (0.356)	1.110 (0.372)	0.977 (0.333)	1.122 (0.395)	0.896 (0.283)
Basic rights respected	0.951 (0.072)	1.153 (0.119)	1.235** (0.127)	0.936 (0.069)	0.931 (0.073)	0.929 (0.073)	0.965 (0.091)	0.921 (0.074)
IGO memberships (ln)	1.236 (0.228)	1.109 (0.215)	1.068 (0.202)	1.157 (0.182)	1.153 (0.172)	1.178 (0.185)	1.286 (0.262)	1.097 (0.152)
GDP/capita (ln)	1.242* (0.154)	1.184 (0.146)	1.027 (0.124)	1.177 (0.141)	1.186 (0.149)	1.131 (0.140)	1.232* (0.155)	1.142 (0.122)
Population (ln)		1.228*** (0.091)						
Urban population (ln)			1.274*** (0.081)					
Already ratified ICCPR				1.687* (0.466)		1.674* (0.490)		
Already ratified ICESCR					1.276 (0.253)	0.795 (0.230)		
Judicial independence							0.841 (0.517)	
After ICCPR but before end of Cold War								3.375 (3.030)
Post Cold War period								6.296*** (3.663)
Constant	0.189* (0.189)	0.018*** (0.025)	0.049*** (0.053)	0.308 (0.302)	0.475 (0.453)	0.635 (0.627)	0.188* (0.185)	0.268 (0.234)
Observations	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,440	1,440	1,275	1,586	1,605
ll	-1004.0	-987.1	-976.0	-892.2	-851.0	-744.5	-991.0	-941.1
chi2	47.84	54.42	72.11	39.54	91.05	116.30	55.77	74.75
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Odds ratios reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country and treaty in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A3: Demanding obligations and treaty ratification, including reservations  
 Ratification within ten years, ordered logistic regression

	1	2
Demanding obligations	0.979*** (0.007)	0.982*** (0.006)
Democracy	1.303 (0.265)	1.615* (0.436)
Democracy X Demanding obligations		0.995* (0.003)
Democratic transition	0.862 (0.301)	0.809 (0.306)
Basic rights respected	0.962 (0.070)	0.961 (0.071)
IGO memberships (ln)	1.152 (0.217)	1.144 (0.211)
GDP/capita (ln)	1.106 (0.157)	1.104 (0.157)
Observations	1,605	1,605
Log-likelihood	-1326	-1325
$\chi^2$	16.89	15.50
$p > \chi^2$	0.0097	0.0167

Robust standard errors clustered by country and treaty.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table A4: Demanding obligations and treaty ratification, time series logistic regressions

	1	2	3	4	5
Demanding obligations	0.986** (0.005)	0.986** (0.005)	0.982*** (0.006)	0.982*** (0.006)	0.983*** (0.006)
Democracy	1.479*** (0.179)	1.646*** (0.214)	1.371** (0.178)	1.370** (0.175)	1.290* (0.194)
Democratic transition	1.704** (0.367)	1.710** (0.365)	2.345*** (0.480)	2.346*** (0.477)	2.396*** (0.439)
Basic rights respected		0.937* (0.036)	0.951 (0.038)	0.950 (0.049)	0.970 (0.052)
IGO memberships (ln)			1.693*** (0.235)	1.691*** (0.257)	1.672*** (0.251)
GDP/capita (ln)				1.004 (0.090)	0.996 (0.079)
Time polynomials included	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	25,188	23,706	23,502	23,502	23,502
Country-treaty clusters	1,867	1,861	1,849	1,849	1,849
Log pseudo-likelihood	-5231	-5038	-4960	-4960	-4954
Wald $\chi^2$	50.80	59.24	95.56	112.66	135.32
$p > \chi^2$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Random effects with odds ratios reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country and treaty in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$



## Appendix B: Summary Statistics and Descriptions of Treaty-Level Variables

Table B1: Functions of clauses in global human rights treaties

Function of the treaty clause	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1. Preamble	33	2.05	2.05
2. General purpose or object	68	4.23	6.29
3. Definition of treaty terms	41	2.55	8.84
4. Treaty mechanics	188	11.71	20.55
5. Obligation	872	54.30	74.84
6. Limitation	33	2.05	76.90
7. Non-derogation	8	0.50	77.40
8. Accept jurisdiction of treaty body	7	0.44	77.83
9. Functioning of treaty body	294	18.31	96.14
10. Other or unclear	62	3.86	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,606</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

Table B2: Does this clause create a precise or imprecise obligation?

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Imprecise	205	23.51	23.51
Precise	667	76.49	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>872</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

Table B3: Is this obligation weak or strong?

	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cum.</b>
Weak	412	47.25	47.25
Strong	460	52.75	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>872</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

Table B4: Does this clause obligate states to take domestic action?

	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cum.</b>
No	76	8.72	8.72
Yes	796	91.28	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>872</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

The measure for demandingness requires that the obligation be precise, strongly worded, and require domestic action. We argued in the main text that all three dimensions contribute to demandingness. However, one might argue that each dimension on its own contributes to demandingness. Table B5 shows how the treaties are ranked by removing each dimension, one at a time. Removing the domestic action requirement does not alter the treaty rankings, likely because most obligations require a domestic action. Relying only on the strength of the obligation likewise does not alter the treaty ranking, except that the ICESCR and CEDAW switch places. The ranking changes when the measure only uses the precision of the obligation. Overall, there is strong correlation among the three dimensions of demandingness.

Table B5: Intercoder agreement, demanding obligations

Variable	Agreement	Expected agreement	Kappa	SE	Z	Prob>Z
Precise	85.39%	63.04%	0.6046	0.0339	17.84	0.0000
Strong	92.06%	50.04%	0.8411	0.0339	24.81	0.0000
Domestic action	97.12%	82.99%	0.8308	0.0338	24.56	0.0000
Demanding obligation	93.66%	65.61%	0.8157	0.0255	31.96	0.0000

Figure B1: Pearson correlation among demandingness dimensions




Table B6: Demandingness ranking using alternative measures

Rank	Strong, Precise, Domestic Action	Strong, Precise	Strong	Precise
1	CRMW	CRMW	CRMW	CRMW
2	CED	CED	CED	CRPD
3	ICCPR	ICCPR	ICCPR	CED
4	CRC	CRC	CRC	CRC
5	CRPD	CRPD	CRPD	ICCPR
6	CAT	CAT	CAT	CEDAW
7	CEDAW	CEDAW	ICESCR	ICESCR
8	ICESCR	ICESCR	CEDAW	CERD
9	GENO	GENO	GENO	CAT
10	CERD	CERD	CERD	GENO

Table B7: Detailed coding instructions for key variables included in analysis

<b>Variable Name:</b>	<b>art_function</b>
Variable label:	General function of the treaty provision being coded.
Coding rules:	Choose the option that best describes the general function or content of this provision.
	<p><b>1 = preamble:</b> this clause is part of the treaty’s preamble</p> <p><b>2 = purpose:</b> this clause expresses a general purpose or object of the treaty or part of the treaty.</p> <p><b>3 = definition of treaty language:</b> this clause defines language or terms employed in the treaty.</p> <p><b>4 = treaty mechanics:</b> this clause establishes mechanisms related to establishing the treaty itself or treaty mechanisms (signing, accession, ratification, entry into force, reporting, creation of treaty bodies).</p> <p><b>5 = obligation:</b> this clause creates a treaty obligation or duty for states parties.</p> <p><b>6 = limitation:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This provision creates limitations on the obligations contained in another provision.</li> <li>• A limitation stipulates conditions under which a provision or part of it does not, or may not, apply.</li> <li>• A clause that introduces a subsequent list of obligations subject to limitation should be coded as a limitation.</li> <li>• Each of the provisions following the introductory limitation clause should also be coded as a limitation.</li> </ul> <p><b>7 = non-derogation:</b> this clause states that the treaty, or specific obligations contained in it, is non-derogable. Non-derogable clauses are obligations that cannot be suspended or for which no exceptions are possible. Non-derogation is usually stipulated in a clause to the effect that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “no exceptional circumstances...may be invoked...”, or</li> <li>• “no derogation from...may be made...”</li> </ul> <p><b>8 = accept jurisdiction of treaty body, court, or committee:</b> this clause relates to states parties’ optional acceptance of the jurisdiction of a treaty</p>

committee, court, or other body (to receive submissions from other states or from individuals; to interpret the treaty; to initiate inquiries).

**9 = functioning of treaty body/court/committee:** this clause specifies the creation, duties, or functioning of the related committee, court, or treaty body.

**10 = other or unclear:** select this option only if none of the previous options applies

**11 = no reservation allowed:** this clause prohibits states from entering reservations, either to a specific provision or to the treaty as a whole.

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<b>Variable name:</b>	<b>specific</b>
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Variable label:	The treaty provision creates a specific rather than a general obligation.
Coding rules:	Code this variable only if you entered “5, obligation” for the previous variable “art_function.”

Choose from the drop-down options:  
**0 = general.** A provision should be coded as “general” if it does not require or imply specifically identifiable actions on the part of the state or other actors.  
**1 = specific**

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<b>Variable name:</b>	<b>strength</b>
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Variable label:	Distinguishes weaker from stronger obligations
Coding rules:	Code this variable only if you entered “5, obligation” for the variable “art_function.”

**0 = weak.** A weak obligation is one that requires states only to attempt, or make an effort, to achieve an objective. Weak obligations express a goal or aspiration rather than concrete steps to take.  
**1 = strong.** A strong obligation is one that requires states to take measures, achieve objectives, or guarantee rights. The language is not just of “undertaking or “seeking” but of doing. The verbs take the form of imperatives (commands).

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<b>Variable name:</b>	<b>domestic_action</b>
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Variable label:	The treaty provision creates an obligation for domestic action. Not all obligations created by a treaty require domestic action. Many provisions obligate states vis-à-vis each other or some international organization. Select “yes” if the provision envisions and requires further action in the laws or institutions of the state.
Coding rules:	<b>1 = yes;</b> the provision being coded creates an obligation for domestic action on the part of the state. The action could be executive, administrative,

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legislative, judicial, or a combination. The goal is to distinguish obligations created for states from obligations for states to take particular domestic measures.

**0 = no;** the provision does not create an obligation for domestic action.

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## Appendix C: Descriptions of Covariates

Table C1 summarizes the variables and data sources used in the main analyses. Data on FDI and trade are originally sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, but we accessed the data from the International Political Economy Data Resource (Graham and Tucker 2017). Data for IGO and INGO membership is notoriously spotty. To develop measures with comprehensive country and time coverage, we combined data on IGOs from two sources: the *Correlates of War* and the *Union of International Associations’ Yearbook on International Organizations*. When interior values are missing, we use linear interpolation. For the IGO membership variable, when values exist from both data sources, we take the average.

Table C1: Data and sources for main analyses		
Measure	Source	Time Coverage
Treaty ratification	(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2018)	1948-2018
IGO membership	(Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2004)	1815-2005
	(Union of International Organizations 2014)	1983-2014
Democracy	(Boix, Miller and Rosato 2022, Graham and Tucker 2019)	1800-2015
Democratic transition	(Boix, Miller et al. 2022, Graham and Tucker 2019)	1800-2015
Basic rights respected	(Fariss 2014, Graham and Tucker 2019)	1949-2013
Judicial independence	(Graham and Tucker 2019, Linzer and Staton 2015)	1948-2012
GDP per capita (log)	(Anders, Fariss and Markowitz 2020)	1500-2015



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