

Producing Truth: Public Memory Projects in Post-Violence Societies

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ABSTRACT

How do societies remember historical political violence? We draw on an original dataset of more than 150 memorialization projects proposed by truth commissions in 28 post-violence countries, from 1970 to 2018. These projects include the removal of monuments, installation of museums, inauguration of national days of remembrance, and more. Truth commission recommendations data allows us to not only consider memory sites once established, but also to examine blueprints for the types of memory that could have been made. We develop a typology and inductively generate a theory of the political contests and conflicts that different memory projects are likely to trigger—contests and conflicts that we expect influence the likelihood of project initiation and completion. We conduct an initial probe of the theory using our new data. In so doing, we offer the first systematic, global study of setting and implementing the memorialization agenda in post-violence societies.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2003, a construction team broke ground in Pretoria, South Africa to build Freedom Park—one government response to the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which had concluded a few months earlier.¹ The park was built as a space where “South Africa’s unique heritage and cultures can be remembered, cherished, and celebrated.”² In addition to commemorating victims of apartheid crimes, the park overlooks the nation’s capital, keeping watch over South Africa’s democracy.³ Visitors enter the park, which begins its ambitious reflection at the beginning of human existence, tracing the struggle for freedom and human rights, from ancient African civilizations to the colonial period to the present day.⁴ Drawing on native influences, the park “challenges visitors to reflect upon our past, improve our present and build on our future as a united nation” and seeks to “accommodate all of the country’s

experiences and symbols to tell one coherent story.”⁵ This bold endeavor to memorialize the past would likely not have been possible without the TRC, which established an authoritative account of political violence during apartheid and outlined plans for redress, including through memorialization.⁶

Half a world away in Dili, Timor-Leste, the Comarca-Balide prison, once a site of torture during the twenty-four-year-long Indonesian occupation, from 1975 to 1999, now houses “living memory” exhibition spaces, a human rights center, and the archives of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR).⁷ The transformation, which was recommended by the CAVR and partially funded by the government, was spearheaded by PT Rosario—a company led by a former political prisoner.⁸ Elements of the building’s time as a prison have been purposefully preserved, from graffiti on cell walls to the complex’s barrack-like buildings.⁹ Those imprisoned at Comarca-Balide left a trail of memory in this site of immense pain, in part through their graffiti messages and also through their involvement in the site’s later transformation. As much a project of national reckoning as it is a site of rehabilitation for the formerly imprisoned, the Comarca-Balide symbolizes efforts to understand and teach about a history of human rights abuses, with the aim of preventing abuses in the future.¹⁰

On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the mayor of Asunción, Paraguay ordered in 1991 the removal of a statue of former dictator Alfredo Stroessner in Lambaré Hill, on the east bank of the Paraguay River.¹¹ The military opposed the order and tried to block the removal.¹² So soon after the dictatorship, and with many groups still divided over the country’s political future, removal was controversial.¹³ Still, the statue came down.¹⁴ It was placed in storage for four years before artist Carlos Colombino was commissioned to create a new monument—a dismembered version of the original, with Stroessner crushed between two large cement blocks, an homage to

victims of repression who were themselves crushed by the dictatorship.¹⁵ Twenty-five years later, in 2016, a student group's decision to take down a bronze plaque dedicated to Stroessner also ignited controversy.¹⁶ The civil society organization Mesa Memoria Histórica defended the students' removal efforts and referenced Paraguay's truth commission: "The action of the young students is protected by the Recommendations of the Truth and Justice Commission, an official body created by law of Congress, which examined the crimes of the dictatorship and human rights violations."¹⁷ The truth commission, which released its recommendations in 2008, prescribed that the government "dismantle public monuments and erase the names of public places linked to people responsible for human rights violations."¹⁸

How these spaces transitioned from one meaning and memory to another, or created new meaning and memory altogether, is demonstrative of a choice in transitional justice: whether and how to memorialize a traumatic past.¹⁹ These four examples demonstrate that memorialization projects differ greatly across contexts.²⁰ The post-conflict memory landscape is malleable and contentious—a range of actors, from government bodies to human rights groups and victims, push for their interests in the post-conflict reconstruction process before the landscape solidifies. Truth commissions, quasi-judicial bodies tasked with investigating past repression, have an especially prominent voice in this process, as they recommend projects for governments to implement, including memory projects.²¹ In this article, we explore how the various intents and methods of proposed memorialization projects influence their implementation. Truth commissions represent an ideal vehicle through which to study memory production, as they make recommendations against which we can methodically evaluate government choices to implement or to not implement a variety of memory projects.

We draw on an original dataset of more than 150 memorialization projects proposed by

truth commissions in 28 post-violence countries, from 1970 to 2018. These projects include removing monuments, installing memory museums, inaugurating national days of remembrance, and more.²² Truth commission recommendations data allows us to not only consider memory sites once established but also to examine blueprints for the types of memory that could have been made and contrast these against the ones that were ultimately made. In so doing, we offer the first systematic, global study of setting and implementing the memorialization agenda in post-violence societies.

From our data, we develop a typology of memorialization projects and inductively generate a theory of the political contests and conflicts that different projects will likely trigger—contests and conflicts that, we expect, influence the likelihood of project initiation and completion. We break down recommended memory projects into four parts, addressing the intent, subject, location, and medium.

First, we begin with project intent: to *remove* existing structures like monuments to the former dictator; to *reclaim* spaces, for example, by transforming former detention centers into memory museums; or to *construct* new memory sites altogether.²³ We expect that recommendations with the intent to construct new memory are more likely to be implemented than those with the intent to remove or reclaim existing memory. The former are likely to be less controversial than the latter because there is a less direct confrontation with the past.

Second, we consider project subject, and we offer a competing set of expectations about recommendations to memorialize specific *incidents* versus overall *patterns* of abuse, and recommendations to memorialize *individuals* versus *groups*.²⁴ Certainly, some specific events and figures may be contentious, raising challenges for implementation.²⁵ Still, there may be consensus around such events and figures. The choice to address an overall pattern of harm or

certain groups may also be controversial if stakeholders believe a memorial project should be more targeted or if stakeholders disagree on what aspects of a group or of past harms should be portrayed.²⁶

Third, we address project location. Recommendations calling for memory projects at *sites of atrocity*, we argue, are less likely to be implemented than those calling for memorialization at *graves, public areas, or intangible locations*. The rationale here is that memorials at trauma sites are more disruptive—and potentially more transformative—than would be memorials in other areas.

Last, we turn to project mediums. We propose that recommendations to erect *monuments* are less likely to be implemented than those to establish *museums, events, or special recognitions*. The logic here is that monuments are fixed and inflexible, unlike museums that can feature different exhibits over time, and unlike events and special recognitions that have a degree of impermanence.

No case of memorialization is cut and dry—the process often reflects the complexity of the conflicts it seeks to commemorate. Still, we maintain that memorialization can be better theorized and analyzed in component parts.

II. MEMORY PRODUCTION: THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

Transitional justice encompasses a range of state actions to reckon with past political violence.²⁷ Generally implemented in the years following armed conflict or autocratic rule, transitional justice mechanisms range from institutions like trials and truth commissions to policies like reparations and reforms.²⁸ While trials usually focus on individual criminal accountability, truth

commissions are quasi-judicial and collect evidence and gather testimonies to produce a broader account of the past and offer policy recommendations.²⁹ Truth commissions seek to promote acknowledgment and accountability by establishing an official truth—a jumping-off point for remedies for the past and safeguards for the future.³⁰

Permeating most transitional justice processes is a desire to contemplate the past.³¹ Memorialization is often a concrete result—it reminds people about past violence as they go about their daily lives, whether it be through a new remembrance day on the calendar or a statue they pass along the road. Often, memorialization invites people to reflect and learn. Some memory projects during transitional moments are informal or temporary, such as “spontaneous shrines” that appear at death sites, but many are officially undertaken by governments as a part of transitional justice.³² Some of the most formal and detailed project proposals can be found among the recommendations that truth commissions make in their concluding reports.³³

Generally, the role of memorialization in transitional justice is to honor those who suffered or died during a period of violence, and to confront the past in order to address contemporary problems or challenges.³⁴ Memorialization projects often have associated goals, such as promoting social recovery, advancing reconciliation, and encouraging civic engagement.³⁵ But memory is not a given—it is a product of dialogue and conflict. Often, societal remembering involves a struggle between opposing memories, understandings, and interpretations of history.³⁶ Leaders construct the past through memorialization, deciding which abuses and victims should be remembered, elided, or modified, to fit their desired narrative and political objectives.³⁷ Memorial projects can also be harnessed as vehicles to promote democracy in transitional societies, though the politicization of these projects can sow division and invite cooptation and sabotage.³⁸ Unequal power structures can also drive the contestation of

memory.³⁹ Often, societal elites have access to resources and networks that allow them to shape public memory, including in educational systems. Elites can thus uphold or challenge the truth of the past.⁴⁰

Early scholarship on memorialization in the modern era focused on Western war memorials, in particular those erected after World War I and World War II.⁴¹ Scholars found that memory projects serve symbolic, aesthetic, and utilitarian functions.⁴² The location of a memorial is also important—one located in a public area may serve a different function than one located at an atrocity site.⁴³ Still, the focus on Western conflicts in early scholarship on memorialization produced a one-dimensional understanding of how societies remember the past—a vision of elaborate, resolute monuments to bravery and heroism.⁴⁴ More recent scholarship has a wider aperture, considering a broader set of cases, acknowledging unsettled memory, and uplifting the voices of victims.⁴⁵ Memorialization, scholarship finds, can extend beyond the physical, for instance, through days of remembrance and commemoration that bring the past into the present.⁴⁶

While recent scholarly works account for differences in forms of memorialization, scholars often do not scrutinize memorialization at a granular level, adopting instead coarse conceptualizations of memory production.⁴⁷ A more nuanced analysis of memorialization projects can help us better understand related intention and controversy, especially when governments use these projects' constituent elements to enhance or diminish their impact.⁴⁸ When a government intentionally places an otherwise powerful memorial far from the public eye, for instance, without scrutinizing the location, the project might be considered a success.⁴⁹

Surprisingly, in transitional justice scholarship, memorialization projects are often studied separately from other mechanisms; memorialization projects are often seen as less

intentional and strategic.⁵⁰ Some scholarship does affirm the political nature of memorialization,⁵¹ but it is often mistaken as a binary choice—something that governments either will or will not do, rather than something that governments can do to varying degrees and scales.⁵² Memory is also sometimes characterized as an afterthought or as a weaker political objective—less desired than other tools in the transitional justice tool-kit and thus undertaken whenever governments get to it.⁵³ Scholars acknowledge memory production in the context of transitional justice is uncharted scholarly terrain.⁵⁴

Because memorialization efforts are frequently led by civil society organizations, memorialization is also often characterized as distinct from government-sponsored transitional justice.⁵⁵ Often, non-governmental products such as locally established peace museums “fill the memory gap,” particularly when states perpetuate cultures of silence.⁵⁶ Tensions between state and civil society agendas complicate the process.⁵⁷ When they do undertake memorialization projects, governments are sometimes more interested in neutralizing disagreements about the past than they are committed to challenging conventional wisdoms.⁵⁸ Still, governments and government-sponsored bodies often support post-violence memorialization, as is evident in the more than 150 recommendations truth commissions have made for memory projects over the past half-century.⁵⁹

Memorialization can flame political contestation, which is why deconstructing memory sites is rare in many countries.⁶⁰ For example, conservative Afrikaners in South Africa resisted the removal of racist monuments after apartheid; thus, the government did not consider removal to be viable. Instead, the government strove to create “national unity and reconciliation.”⁶¹ Many of these sites, like the Voortrekker Monument and the statue of Paul Kruger, both in Pretoria, remain standing to this day.⁶² Governments can instead choose to reframe existing memorials to

avoid the debate over removal.⁶³ With regard to the current debate over Confederate monuments in the United States (U.S.), scholars have examined strategies to preserve, recontextualize, and reclaim monuments as alternatives to removing them.⁶⁴

This article regards memory making as a public policy response to truth commissions, often considered a prime transitional justice opportunity for a country.⁶⁵ We seek to address the following questions: What types of memorialization projects do truth commissions recommend and what types of projects do governments implement? In addition, does implementation of memorialization projects vary with the intent and suggested subject, location, or medium?

We refine existing frameworks by identifying categories of intent to understand the values and goals of memorialization proposals. Further, we disaggregate memory products into their constituent elements: subject, location, and medium. Building on data from the *Varieties of Truth Commissions*,⁶⁶ we analyze the implementation (and non-implementation) of memorialization projects recommended by truth commissions within a decade of their conclusion—a window of opportunity for reflection and action on the past. By systematically analyzing memory production, we can better understand the politics of memorialization.

III. THE POLITICS OF MEMORIALIZATION

Extending prior research, we develop a four-part typology of memory production, with each proposal assessed by intent, subject, location, and medium. This typology asserts a new method of analysis for memorialization—that there is a definable logic in the conceptualization of a given project. We then propose the likelihood of implementation based on a project’s position within our typology.

A. Intent

To begin, we categorize calls for memorialization under three main categories of intent. The first category of intent is removal, the act of taking down existing elements of the commemorative landscape.⁶⁷ Consider Confederate monuments in the U.S., whose removal represents a powerful stance against a racist and violent past.⁶⁸ Second, memory projects can seek to make memory in a form that did not previously exist.⁶⁹ Examples of memory construction include the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. and the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg, South Africa; they were built from scratch.⁷⁰ A third category of intent is reclamation.⁷¹ These memory projects seek to convert or restore an existing site—often a trauma site—into a site of memory, such as the Comarca-Balide in Timor-Leste, which we discussed earlier.⁷² By categorizing recommendations by intent, we can assess whether some memory projects are more likely to be implemented because of their most basic goals.

Drawing upon previous research and empirical observations, we theorize that construction is less controversial than reclamation and removal because construction represents a less direct threat to the existing memory landscape and potential anti-transitional justice interests.⁷³ Reclamation and removal inherently alter existing spaces and invite contestation and conflict during the implementation process; there are likely more “veto players,” or actors that may seek to inhibit the success of a reclamation or removal project.

Thus, we propose that the intent of a recommended memory project will influence its initiation and completion. Recommendations with the intent to construct may cause less controversy than those calling for removal or reclamation and might, therefore, be more likely to be implemented.

Hypothesis 1: Recommendations with the intent to construct new memory are more likely to be implemented than those with the intent to remove or reclaim existing memory.

B. Subject

Beyond intent, we seek to understand how the context and substance of a proposed memory project can affect its adoption. In its subject, a memory site can address incidents or overall patterns, and individuals or groups. By incidents, we refer to single events or atrocities within limited time periods, whereas an overall pattern concerns an extended period of violence or conflict. For example, the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) recommended a monument at Wagalla, Wajir to remember the region's February 1984 massacre, i.e., a specific incident.⁷⁴ The commission also called for the President and other government officials to publicly apologize for and commemorate violations investigated by the TJRC, i.e., an overall pattern of abuse.⁷⁵

Likewise, projects with individual subjects commemorate specific people, while those with group subjects memorialize a group of people, such as the fallen listed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.⁷⁶ We use a relational approach based on a truth commission's original mandate to determine whether a memory project addresses subgroups of victims. For example, the 2009 Canadian TRC focused on the Indian residential school system, so recommendations targeted at survivors and victims of the system concern the whole group, not a subgroup.⁷⁷ In contrast, Brazil's recommendation to memorialize repression of LGBTQ+ individuals during the dictatorship indicates a subgroup within the commission's mandate.⁷⁸

Based on existing research, the import of a memory project's particular subject is not clear.⁷⁹ While some specific events and figures can be points of great contention, the choice to

address an overall pattern of abuse or groups of victims can also be controversial.⁸⁰ Thus, we propose a competing set of hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2a: Recommendations to memorialize specific incidents of abuse are more likely to be implemented than those to memorialize a pattern of abuse.

Hypothesis 2b: Recommendations to memorialize specific incidents of abuse are less likely to be implemented than those to memorialize a pattern of abuse.

Hypothesis 2c: Recommendations to memorialize individuals are more likely to be implemented than those to memorialize groups.

Hypothesis 2d: Recommendations to memorialize individuals are less likely to be implemented than those to memorialize groups.

C. Location

We also categorize memorialization based on the suggested location of the project, including atrocity sites, public areas, graves, and others. Memory projects situated at atrocity sites, such as the “S-21” detention center in Cambodia, seek to remember the specific events that occurred there.⁸¹ Sites of memory in public areas, like outside a national parliament building, do not form this spatial link but seek integration into the everyday landscape.⁸² Memorialization at graves can occur within cemeteries or other resting places, while intangible locations include projects that do not have a clear physical position, such as dates of remembrance or commemorative ceremonies.⁸³ We propose that memorials located at sites of atrocity will be more controversial than those situated at public areas, graves, or intangible locations because they are located at the site of the initial conflict.

Monuments, events, and museums in general public areas, which lack a geographical link to the subject being memorialized, are the most highly visible forms of memory. Often located in

city centers, parks, or tourist areas, they serve as an easily accessible and prominent reminder of the past.⁸⁴ They work toward the ultimate goal of strengthening society's framework of memory.⁸⁵ Although implementing approved memory projects in public spaces can engender conflict, disagreements typically center around aesthetic concerns such as the specific design and form of the memorial.⁸⁶ Due to the physical separation from the triggering site, dissent in these contexts lacks the emotion and connection that may lead to deeper, more sustained contestation.⁸⁷ The non-sacred sense of place, alongside the fact that many public memorials also fulfill a utilitarian purpose, may also create less controversy among potential stakeholders.⁸⁸

Spatial significance to historical trauma is the key aspect that makes memorialization at atrocity sites particularly vulnerable to contestation.⁸⁹ Unlike those in public areas, these projects must reframe and present history in a way that captures the memories inherent to the space.⁹⁰ The process of making memory at places of trauma must encompass a wide range of social purposes: memorializing atrocities and resistance to them, serving as a site for survivors and victims' families to grieve, and functioning as a hub for community engagement.⁹¹ Even before friction arises over the best way to achieve these objectives, there is the initial divide between those advocating for the commercialization of the space and those fighting to reclaim it as solely a site of memory.⁹² Memorials situated at trauma sites are also far more disruptive than memorialization in public areas.⁹³ The act of bringing people together to interact in a space with such heightened symbolism and salience allows for evolution on an individual and societal level.⁹⁴ This transformation can lead to political movements for change.⁹⁵

Memorialization at grave sites shares a similar emotional gravity to memorialization at atrocity sites. Often, these burial places are located near places of historical violence, including mass killings. However, with memory production at resting places, the individual and their

personal story are centered. The broader political and historical context of oppression and violence is set aside to focus on those who died.⁹⁶ Thus, these memorials function more as a space for loved ones and survivors to mourn than as a space for mobilization and confrontation.

Memory that lacks a physical location, typically associated with events and special recognitions, is characterized by its nonspatial nature. Without a clear grounding in a particular location, ties to the past may be weaker. The physical place provides a necessary social function, particularly when memorials encompass powerful sentiments that benefit from groups gathering at a place to express them.⁹⁷ Thus, intangible memorial efforts may produce weaker emotional reactions, leading to reduced dissension among stakeholders.

Hypothesis 3: Recommendations calling for memory projects at sites of atrocity are less likely to be implemented than those calling for memorialization at graves, public areas, or intangible locations.

D. Medium

Finally, we examine the various mediums through which memory can be produced: monuments, events, museums, and special recognitions. Museums and archives, like the Kigali Genocide Memorial and the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile, aim to gather, preserve, exhibit, and explain the past through a guided experience.⁹⁸ Monuments can take the form of physical structures, statues, and plaques, while events include commemorations and days of remembrance.⁹⁹ Memorialization can also occur through the granting of special recognition or status to a place, individual, or group. We theorize that memorialization projects calling for monuments are more likely contested than museums, events, or special recognitions because monuments present a “fixed” memory and are least able to absorb criticism or be changed.

Museums are often regarded as presenting an official narrative of the past, though they are subjectively and strategically shaped.¹⁰⁰ Museums can be contested, as the display of an object intended to inform and invite conversation, for example, can spark controversy.¹⁰¹ Curators are agents of memorialization that create generative spaces built on a mission or principle. For existing museums and sites being converted into museums, what is preserved and what is excluded is up for debate, particularly when museums engage with human rights issues.¹⁰² But museums are structured to embrace criticism—they can acknowledge nuance in permanent collections and highlight untold truths through temporary exhibitions and experience-based programs.¹⁰³ Further, museum professionals have internal systems of consultation to receive criticism and effect change when needed.¹⁰⁴ For example, when conservative political appointee Darío Acevedo was named the director of Colombia’s new National Museum of Memory, victims’ associations and fellow academics criticized his treatment of victims’ stories.¹⁰⁵ The backlash was so strong that Acevedo was pushed out of his role in July 2022.¹⁰⁶ Museums are thus a dynamic space whose narratives encourage dialogue and fuse official and public views of the past, with a certain amount of power balancing.¹⁰⁷

Whereas museums catalog and narrate the past, monuments capture an idea, a moment, or a feeling.¹⁰⁸ While the term “monument” often evokes a spirit of triumph or victory, many remember or pay tribute to victims and the fallen.¹⁰⁹ Often, only a few closely related narratives are present in a monument.¹¹⁰ While museums serve not only as objects but indeed as subjects, even actors, in the memorialization landscape, monuments are more static objects.¹¹¹ Monuments *can* be places of dialogue and discourse, but shaping these conversations often requires additional programming that the monument alone does not offer.¹¹² Art history debates on the importance of context have complicated the assertion that monuments are tied to their

iconography and political intentions.¹¹³ Art historians have begun to view monuments as temporary “placeholders”—intended to be continuously reevaluated.¹¹⁴

Like monuments, events such as ceremonies and commemorative dates can present one “fixed” narrative. Situated between museums and monuments in malleability, commemorative events are permanent on a calendar but can be shaped by programming and perceived importance. Some events have past cultural significance that can facilitate future reconciliation, such as locally-based ceremonies in post-conflict Cambodia influenced by popular Buddhist rituals.¹¹⁵ Others can be controversial since they are subjective and many stakeholders are involved.¹¹⁶ Still, events are ephemeral. While they can leave lasting impressions, they do not take up permanent physical space and are not constant reminders of an atrocity. Thus, attendance or viewership is less “mandatory” than memorialization with a physical footprint.

Special recognition is the least concrete medium of memorialization and the least direct in messaging, which can depend upon audience demographics. Memory sites deemed “heritage sites” by UNESCO, for example, can have reflective significance, but are also often shaped by tourism as a “structured form of meaning-making.”¹¹⁷ Likewise, tourism can give meaning to a site.¹¹⁸ Tourism also has inherent monetary motivations.¹¹⁹ While other memorial sites can draw tourists, special recognition alone is not enough to ensure visitors will interact with the site’s historical significance.¹²⁰ Since special recognition is so variable, is the most voluntary in memory “participation,” and can involve other motivations, it is likely less contested than other mediums, and certainly monuments.¹²¹

Hypothesis 4: Recommendations calling for the establishment of monuments are less likely to be implemented than those calling for the establishment of museums, events, or special recognitions.

Variation in memorialization projects’ subject, location, and medium results in some

public memory being set in the built environment and some in the psychic space. Timing and placement can determine whether one is forced to acknowledge a memorial. Applying our previously-discussed continuum of a memorial's "concreteness," based on its medium, some commemorative dates, for instance, can be more fluid in interpretation than physical monuments because an individual's understanding of the past depends on whether they engage with the date. Physical monuments can be avoided perhaps, but they are more difficult to ignore than commemorations. When someone encounters a monument or statue, they are forced to acknowledge its existence. Even so, the same physical monument can have greater gravity if it is located in a central square of a city or a former site of atrocity versus a non-symbolic location on the outskirts of a city. Thus, subject, location, and medium interact with each other. Though they cannot be perfectly separated, analyzing each aspect in turn allows us to assess the factors driving varying levels of initiation and implementation of memorialization projects.

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN

To assess the success of truth commissions' memory proposals, we draw on a series of datasets collectively known as the *Varieties of Truth Commissions*.¹²² One of the datasets captures approximately six thousand recommendations made by truth commissions around the world, from 1970 to 2018.¹²³ Among these are 162 memorialization projects recommended by commissions in 28 countries.¹²⁴ We build on these data following the coding protocol in Zvobgo (2024) to construct two key dependent variables: *Implementation initiated* and *Implementation level*.¹²⁵ Each of these variables is examined within ten years of the release of the truth commission's final report. The resulting dataset, *The Global Memory Production Project*, can be

obtained via the Harvard Dataverse.¹²⁶

Implementation initiated is a binary variable that receives a 1 for a given recommendation if any evidence exists of some progress on the memory project, otherwise 0. An exploratory report from a federal agency, a speech from a legislator, a debate within parliament on the topic of the recommendation, etc. all qualify as evidence of initiation. The three-point variable *Implementation level* captures whether an initiated recommendation achieved minimal, intermediate, or full implementation.

If implementation was initiated, the level of implementation is automatically coded as *minimal*. For example, the truth commission in Côte d'Ivoire recommended the creation of national and regional memorials and an archive of information on the Ivorian conflicts.¹²⁷ Although a 2020 government press release indicates support for the construction of national and regional memory sites, there is no evidence of further progress.¹²⁸

If evidence suggests full implementation was likely within the ten-year period of analysis but heretofore incomplete, implementation is coded as *intermediate*. For instance, Germany's second truth commission on the East German dictatorship proposed the construction of a memorial and official documentation center in Berlin to commemorate the June 17, 1953 uprising.¹²⁹ While the memorial was unveiled within five years, in 2000, in front of Berlin's Federal Ministry of Finance, no official information and documentation center supplementing the memorial was established within ten years.¹³⁰

If every aspect of the recommendation was achieved within the ten-year timeframe, then implementation is coded as *full*. As an example, the 1999 Burkina Faso truth commission recommended the organization of a national day of forgiveness.¹³¹ On March 30, 2001, the President inaugurated the National Day of Forgiveness, to recognize the State's crimes against its

people and to unify the nation.¹³²

A. Identifying Recommendation Intent, Subject, Location, and Medium

We seek to predict the implementation of memorialization recommendations using characteristics of the proposed project, as outlined in our substance coding—disaggregated by intent, subject, location, and medium, as presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Categories of Memorialization

Intent		
Removal	Reclamation	Construction
Subject		
Incident of abuse	Atrocity site	Monument, statue, plaque
Pattern of abuse	Public area	Event, day of remembrance
Specific individual	Grave site	Museum, archive
Group	Intangible location	Special recognition

A variable was coded 1 if a recommendation called for that form of memorialization, otherwise 0. For a single recommendation, at least one variable was coded 1 from each category. In other words, a recommendation could not forgo a category entirely—for all memorialization, there must be an intent, subject, location, and medium. If a recommendation did not specify, say, a specific location, it was coded as “other.” Recommendations can call for projects with multiple intents, subjects, locations, or mediums, which is reflected in the coding. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the commission wrote:

The Commission calls on the Government of Liberia to publicly acknowledge the role of its predecessor in promoting war and armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The Government of Liberia should consider an act of symbolic reparation to Sierra Leone and its people. This could be in the form of an event or the erection of a monument in Sierra Leone to the memory of all those who died in the conflict.¹³³

In this case, the commission called for a monument and an event in one recommendation.

Thus, both *Medium: Monument* and *Medium: Event* were coded as 1.¹³⁴

Our coding scheme counters the notion that memorialization is less intentional than other transitional justice processes. Our framework for coding implementation has been used to measure the implementation of a number of other topics of interest, from personnel reforms to exhumations.¹³⁵ Thus, we analyze memorialization with similar rigor as other processes.¹³⁶

B. Analysis

We begin with a descriptive analysis of the intent, subject, location, and medium of recommended memorialization projects. The vast majority called for the construction of new memory (115 recommendations, or 71 percent). Meanwhile, 47 recommendations (approximately 29 percent) called for reclamation. Only one called for removal.

Construction. The data suggests that commissions prefer to recommend construction of new memory and, as we show later, governments seem to prefer to implement construction projects. This is consistent with our expectation that new memory is easier to produce because it is less contentious; simply, it does not directly confront or threaten the existing memory landscape. Instead, new memorials can take public support and political feasibility into consideration. And since the sites do not already exist, governments can also pick and choose what to implement and where, and what to ignore.

Reclamation. Commissions handle differently the choice to reclaim or construct. In only three commissions were reclamation recommendations in the majority: Central African Republic, Kenya, and Mauritius. Many more chose to recommend construction above other intents, including Brazil, Canada, Germany, Morocco, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Togo.¹³⁷ We note that opportunities for reclamation—while important in preserving spaces and their symbolic meaning—are limited, since reclamation depends on a site existing in order for it to be altered. Commissions may have an inclination toward construction for ease of production and comparatively low resistance, and perhaps because there are simply more opportunities to construct than to reclaim.

Removal. Several factors can explain the low number of removal recommendations among truth commission reports worldwide. First, many memorials are destroyed, whether intentionally or unintentionally, during the periods of violence that commissions investigate.¹³⁸ Moreover, in transitional settings, not all memorialization waits for a truth commission.¹³⁹ Often, reactive memorialization—involving the removal of existing monuments, whether through official or unofficial means—precedes the commission.¹⁴⁰ A striking historical example of this phenomenon is post-World War II West Germany, where every monument, statue, name, or building that glorified or preserved the old Nazi regime was methodically taken down.¹⁴¹ By the time the Federal Republic of Germany made the display of swastikas illegal in 1949, the vast majority of Nazi monuments had been demolished by the Allied Control Council.¹⁴² Thus, the practical need for recommendations relating to removal may be nonexistent in different contexts, explaining the overall low number of removal recommendations. That said, if monuments from a previous regime exist, removal can be controversial. In some contexts, it can even be seen as undesirable. Many commissions conduct their work with a “never again” mindset—committed to

remembering the past so that it is not forgotten or misremembered. In this vein, commissions may see removal as erasure. Reclamation, the transformation of a space, may be viewed as a more favorable or thoughtful alternative to removal.

We find that the distribution of recommendations among our other categories—subject, location, and medium—varies but generally one category enjoys a majority. A pattern of harm constitutes the majority of all subjects. Suggested locations for memory projects are broadly split between sites of atrocity, public areas, and intangible sites. Monuments, statues, and plaques comprise the majority of all mediums. These data are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Recommendations by Subject, Location, and Medium.

Subject		Location		Medium	
Incidents of abuse	23 (14%)	Atrocity sites	49 (30%)	Monuments, statues, and plaques	83 (51%)
Patterns of abuse	108 (67%)	Public areas	66 (41%)	Events, days of remembrance	52 (32%)
Specific individuals	16 (10%)	Grave sites	13 (8%)	Museums and archives	33 (20%)
Groups	42 (26%)	Intangible locations	58 (36%)	Special recognitions	26 (16%)
Other	5 (3%)	Other	8 (5%)	Other	6 (4%)
Total Number of Recommendations				162	

Note: Percentages in each category (i.e., subject, location, and medium) exceed 100 because of compound recommendations.

Subject. It is interesting that recommendations calling for memorialization of an overall pattern of abuse are recommended at a rate of roughly four to one to those seeking to

memorialize a specific incident.¹⁴³ This could indicate that referring to a more general trend of violence or abuse is seen as more politically feasible than pinpointing a particular event, perhaps because the language allows for more leeway in interpretation and flexibility in implementation. However, it may also be the case that the category of “overall pattern” encompasses more recommendations simply because it is broad. The low number of recommendations to honor specific individuals, as compared to groups, may indicate the risks of memorializing a single person who, by virtue of being remembered in a post-violent context, is most likely recognizable and divisive enough to stir controversy. As the U.S. and other countries witnessed in 2020, monuments to controversial historical figures often receive the most public attention and outcry, suggesting that it may be easier for activists to mobilize protests around individuals.¹⁴⁴

Location. The near-three-way split of recommendation locations between public areas, atrocity sites, and non-spatial memory may indicate that the architects of post-violence memory believe it is important to propose sites in various regions and realms of public consciousness.¹⁴⁵ Implementation might also be more difficult for recommendations concentrated in one area, due to public opinion or logistical challenges.

Medium. That recommendations for monuments, statues, and plaques comprise the majority of mediums in the dataset suggests that they may be perceived as more politically feasible than we initially thought, as compared to other mediums of memory, particularly museums.¹⁴⁶ As we outlined, museums, special recognitions, and events are more malleable in their interpretation than are monuments. Monuments may thus be more politically effective and steadfast representations of the implementing government’s stance on the past. Monuments may also be simpler to put in place than museums, which are typically expensive and more complicated, requiring facilities, staff, and visitors to stay active.¹⁴⁷

Time may also play a role: the more extensive planning necessary to create a museum could lead to consideration and implementation years, even decades, after other memorialization mediums. In such a case, many museums would not be captured within our dataset's ten-year window. To give an example outside our project database that reflects this idea, Mexico's monument to the victims of the Tlatelolco Massacre was erected in 1993, while the doors to the Memorial 68 Museum did not open until 2007.¹⁴⁸ Though both sites memorialize violence from the same year, 1968, the museum opened fourteen years after the monument.¹⁴⁹ The low cost and relative ease associated with granting special recognition to a site or declaring a national holiday, by contrast, may result in less of a time lag. This perhaps explains why both intangible mediums and monuments, which are quicker to construct, appear more often in our database; governments may balance cost, permanence, and feasibility when choosing from the menu of memorialization options.¹⁵⁰

Implementation. Of the 162 memorialization recommendations in our dataset, 91 were initiated (roughly 56 percent). Of those that were initiated, 52 percent stalled at minimal implementation, 21 percent reached intermediate status, and 27 percent were completed.

C. Statistical Analysis

We evaluate our hypotheses using logit regressions to study whether implementation was initiated and ordered logit regressions to study the level of implementation reached. We begin with initiation. As displayed in Table 3, there is a positive association between recommendations about construction and project initiation, consistent with our first hypothesis.¹⁵¹ But the difference between these recommendations and those about removal or reclamation is not

statistically distinguishable from zero.

Table 3. Effect of Intent on Initiation.

DV = Initiation		Coef. (SE)	<i>p</i> -value
Intent	Construct	0.41 (0.34)	0.23

*Reference category: Removal and Reclamation.

Note: Model is a bivariate logit regression. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by commission.

Moving on to the level of implementation, among initiated recommendations, there is a negative association between recommendations about construction and the outcome, contrary to our first hypothesis.¹⁵² Still, the difference between recommendations about construction and those about removal or reclamation is not statistically significant at a conventional error level. Overall, we find weak support for Hypothesis 1, that recommendations with the intent to construct new memory will be more likely to be implemented than those with the intent to remove or reclaim existing memory.

Table 4. Effect of Intent on Implementation Level.

DV = Level		Coef. (SE)	<i>p</i> -value
Intent	Construct	-0.31 (0.43)	0.47

*Reference category: Removal and Reclamation.

Note: Model is a bivariate ordered logit regression. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by commission.

Tests for our second, third, and fourth hypotheses are displayed in Tables 5 and 6. Consistent with Hypotheses 2a and 2d, we find that the association between recommendations to

memorialize specific incidents and project initiation is positive and statistically significant, and the association between recommendations to memorialize individuals and project initiation is negative and statistically significant.¹⁵³ Moving on to Hypothesis 3, as expected, we find a negative association between recommendations for memorialization at atrocity sites and project initiation, but the association is not statistically significant.¹⁵⁴ Last, running counter to Hypothesis 4, we find that monument recommendations are positively correlated with initiation, though the relationship is not statistically significant.¹⁵⁵

Table 5. Effect of Subject, Location, and Medium on Initiation.

DV = Initiation		Coef. (SE)	<i>p</i> -value
Subject	Incident	0.91 (0.36)	0.01
*Reference category: Pattern of abuse.			
Subject	Individual	-1.15 (0.59)	0.05
*Reference category: Group.			
Location	Atrocity Site	-0.30 (0.31)	0.33
*Reference category: Graves, Public areas, Intangible location, and Other.			
Medium	Monument	0.14 (0.27)	0.61
*Reference category: Museums and archives, Events and days of remembrance, and Special recognitions.			

Note: Models are bivariate logit regressions, stacked for ease of reading. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by commission.

The results somewhat differ when we turn to the level of implementation. Similar to the initiation analysis, the level analysis reveals a negative and statistically significant effect for recommendations to memorialize individuals.¹⁵⁶ The implementation level analysis also reveals a

positive, though not statistically significant, effect for monument recommendations.¹⁵⁷ Dissimilar to the initiation analysis, however, the level analysis shows a negative effect for recommendations to memorialize specific incidents, though the effect is only marginally significant.¹⁵⁸ The implementation level analysis further shows a positive effect of recommendations for memorialization at atrocity sites, though the effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero.¹⁵⁹ Overall, we only find strong support for Hypotheses 2d, regarding memorialization of individuals. For all others, we find mixed or no support across the initiation and level analyses.

Table 6. Effect of Subject, Location, and Medium on Implementation Level.

DV = Level		Coef. (SE)	<i>p</i> -value
Subject	Incident	-0.44 (0.27)	0.10
*Reference category: Pattern of abuse.			
Subject	Individual	-17.04 (0.55)	0.00
*Reference category: Group.			
Location	Atrocity Site	0.38 (0.35)	0.29
*Reference category: Graves, Public areas, Intangible location, and Other.			
Medium	Monument	0.42 (0.38)	0.27
*Reference category: Museums and archives, Events and days of remembrance, and Special recognitions.			

Note: Models are bivariate ordered logit regressions, stacked for ease of reading. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by commission.

V. DISCUSSION

Our analysis helps scholars understand why governments may choose to implement certain memorialization projects over others, as well as which projects are most likely to be proposed and implemented. Still, our results do not mean only historically successful projects should be attempted. Some more challenging or long-term projects—such as transforming former atrocity sites and building museums—are not quickly implemented but are significant when they finally are. And the very fact that they were recommended is important. While our analysis focused on the “blueprints” truth commissions provide for memory production, allowing us to disaggregate proposals and systematically track their implementation, not all post-violence societies have commissions. Future research might apply our typology and theory to memorialization plans prompted by other transitional justice mechanisms. Future work may also explore in greater detail “missed opportunities” in post-violence memory making.

Not all memorialization debates occur in the aftermath of political violence, to be sure.¹⁶⁰ In many cases, memorialization is a lingering question, one that persists for decades, even centuries, after a regime of abuse.¹⁶¹ In this sense, countries like the U.S. have not vigorously confronted past political and memory regimes—including slavery, the Confederacy, and Jim Crow segregation.¹⁶² Regrettably, transitional justice scholarship traditionally excludes the U.S. case.¹⁶³ Doing so falsely signals that transitional justice in otherwise “stable” democracies is not a worthy area of study and perpetuates myths of American and Western exceptionalism. Further systematic analysis is needed on the production of public memory and associated contestation in Global South and Global North contexts, the U.S. included.

ENDNOTES

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¹ Freedom Park, *About Freedom Park*, FREEDOM PARK (Mar. 4, 2022), <https://freedompark.co.za/about/> [<https://perma.cc/DCH5-AZQH>].

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ Robyn K. Autry, *The Monumental Reconstruction of Memory in South Africa: The Voortrekker Monument*, 29 THEORY, CULTURE, & SOC'Y 146 (2012).

⁷ Emma Coupland, *The Comarca*, CAVR, TIMOR-LESTE (June 20, 2022), <http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/comarca.htm> [<https://perma.cc/EW4K-DJ5X>].

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ Pandaya, *Comarca Balide Prison: A Monument of Tragedy*, JAKARTA POST (Sept. 13, 2009),

<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/13/comarca-balide-prison-a-monument-tragedy.html> [https://perma.cc/TJN7-X46H].

¹⁰ Michael Leach, *Difficult Memories*, in PLACES OF PAIN AND SHAME: DEALING WITH “DIFFICULT HERITAGE” 144 (William Logan & Keir Reeves eds., 2008).

¹¹ Chris Moss, *Why the Toppling of Colston’s Statue Was a Missed Opportunity*, TELEGRAPH (June 9, 2020), <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/comment/colston-statue-monuments-to-malefactors/> [https://perma.cc/K73U-W39E].

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ Mesa Memoria Histórica, *Comunicación a la Opinión Pública*, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2016), <https://www.facebook.com/mesamemoriapy/posts/832089996895564> [https://perma.cc/S9JN-TKZ4].

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ Among truth commission recommendations in our database, this is the only one calling for the removal of a monument. Comisión Verdad y Justicia, *Informe Final, Capítulo Conclusiones y Recomendaciones*, 92 (2008), https://www.derechoshumanos.net/lesahumanidad/informes/paraguay/Informe_Comision_Verdad_y_Justicia_Paraguay_Conclusiones_y_Recomendaciones.pdf.

¹⁹ We contend that both proposals for memorialization and implementation decisions are made strategically, by the truth commission in the first instance and the government in the second instance. Proposals can involve both high- and low-hanging fruit, with the goal that something, if not everything, is implemented. We acknowledge that implementation may also be shaped by a government’s *ability* to act, not only its *willingness* to do so.

²⁰ Note that throughout, we will use “memorialization projects,” “memory projects,” “memorials,” etc. interchangeably.

²¹ Eduardo González & Howard Varney, *What are Truth Commissions?*, in TRUTH SEEKING: ELEMENTS OF CREATING AN EFFECTIVE TRUTH COMMISSION (2013).

²² Alexandra Byrne, Bilen Zerie & Kelebogile Zvobgo, *Replication Data for: Producing Truth: Public Memory Projects in Post-Violence Societies*, HARVARD DATAVERSE (2024), <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KSSTND>. See *infra* Section III. THE POLITICS OF

MEMORIALIZATION for examples and references for further reading.

²³ See *infra* sub-section A. *Intent* under Section III. THE POLITICS OF MEMORIALIZATION for examples and references for further reading.

²³ See *infra* sub-section B. *Subject* under Section III. THE POLITICS OF MEMORIALIZATION for examples and references for further reading.

²⁵ We recognize that memorials focused on an individual could, at least in theory, simultaneously represent the group of which the individual is a part; still, this is not a given.

²⁶ Memorials encompassing groups could provide members of the in-group a rallying point that could make government implementation more likely. But this could also provide members of the out-group a counter-rallying point that could make implementation less likely. Mobilization and counter-mobilization efforts could also cancel each other out.

²⁷ United Nations, *About Transitional Justice and Human Rights*, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (Jan. 7, 2024), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice/about-transitional-justice-and-human-rights#:~:text=Transitional%20justice%20processes%20include%20truth,civil%20society%2C%20memorialization%20efforts%2C%20cultural> [https://perma.cc/JV9M-GEZV].

²⁸ Paige Arthur, *How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice*, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321 (2009).

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ Kelebogile Zvobgo, *Designing Truth: Facilitating Perpetrator Testimony at Truth Commissions*, 18 J. HUM. RTS. 92 (2019).

³¹ *Id.*

³² Jack Santino, *Performative Commemoratives: Spontaneous Shrines and the Public Memorialization of Death*, in SPONTANEOUS SHRINES AND THE PUBLIC MEMORIALIZATION OF DEATH 5 (Jack Santino, ed., 2006).

³³ Kelebogile Zvobgo, GOVERNING TRUTH: NGOs AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2024) (unpublished book manuscript).

³⁴ Jusy Barsalou & Victoria Baxter, *The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transnational Justice*, 5 STABILIZATION & RECONSTRUCTION 1 (2007).

³⁵ *Id.*; Jeffrey K. Olick, *Collective Memory: The Two Cultures*, 17 SOC. THEORY 333 (1999); Mneesha Gellman, *Teaching Silence in the Schoolroom: Whither National History in Sierra*

Leone and El Salvador?, 36 THIRD WORLD Q. 147 (2015).

³⁶ Elizabeth Jelin, *Public Memorialization in Perspective: Truth, Justice and Memory of Past Repression in the Southern Cone of South America*, 1 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 138 (2007).

³⁷ MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY (1992).

³⁸ Sebastian Brett et al., *Memorialization and Democracy: State Policy and Civic Action*, INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2007).

³⁹ Krista Billingsley, *Memorialization as a Mechanism of Power in the Present: The Creation and Contestation of National Narratives in the Wake of Internal Armed Conflict*, 102 SOC. SCI. Q. 1167 (2021).

⁴⁰ Mneesha Gellman, *Remembering Violence: The Role of Apology and Dialogue in Turkey's Democratization Process*, 20 DEMOCRATIZATION 771 (2013); Mneesha Gellman & Michelle Bellino, *Fighting Invisibility: Indigenous Citizens and History Education in El Salvador and Guatemala*, 14 LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN ETHNIC STUD. 1 (2019).

⁴¹ Bernard Barber, *Place, Symbol, and Utilitarian Function in War Memorials*, 28 SOC. FORCES 64 (1949).

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ James M. Mayo, *War Memorials as Political Memory*, 78 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 62 (1988).

⁴⁴ Barber, *supra* note 41, at 64-68.

⁴⁵ Billingsley, *supra* note 39.

⁴⁶ Jelin, *supra* note 36, at 142.

⁴⁷ Duncan Light & Craig Young, *Public Memory, Commemoration and Transitional Justice: Reconfiguring the Past in Public Space*, in POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM 25 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 233 (Lavinia Stan & Nadya Nedelsky eds., 2015).

⁴⁸ Robin Wagner-Pacifici & Barry Schwartz, *The Vietnam Veterans Memorial: Commemorating a Difficult Past*, 97 AM. J. SOC. 376 (1991).

⁴⁹ Barber, *supra* note 41, at 65.

⁵⁰ Brandon Hamber, Liz Ševčenko & Ereshnee Naidu, *Utopian Dreams or Practical Possibilities? The Challenges of Evaluating the Impact of Memorialization in Societies in Transition*, 4 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 397 (2010).

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² Victoria Bernal, *Diaspora, Digital Media, and Death Counts: Eritreans and the Politics of Memorialisation*, 72 AFR. STUD. 246 (2013); Patricia Pinkerton, *Resisting Memory: The Politics of Memorialisation in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland*, 14 BRIT. J. POL. & INT'L RELATIONS 131 (2012).

⁵³ Robin Adèle Greeley et al., *Repairing Symbolic Reparations: Assessing the Effectiveness of Memorialization in the Inter-American System of Human Rights*, 14 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 165, 165 (2020).

⁵⁴ Light & Young, *supra* note 47, at 237.

⁵⁵ Dženeta Karabegović, *Who Chooses to Remember? Diaspora Participation in Memorialization Initiatives*, 42 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1911 (2019).

⁵⁶ Gellman, *supra* note 35, at 147.

⁵⁷ Brett et al., *supra* note 38, at 8-9.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ Byrne et al., *supra* note 22.

⁶⁰ Cillian McGrattan & Stephen Hopkins, *Memory in Post-Conflict Societies: From Contention to Integration?*, 16 ETHNOPOLITICS 488 (2017).

⁶¹ Autry, *supra* note 6, at 146.

⁶² *Id.* at 147-48.

⁶³ Elizabeth Rankin, *Creating/Curating Cultural Capital: Monuments and Museums for Post-Apartheid South Africa*, 2 HUMANITIES 72 (2013).

⁶⁴ Joanna Burch-Brown, *Should Slavery's Statues Be Preserved? On Transitional Justice and Contested Heritage*, 39 J. APPLIED PHIL. 807 (2020).

⁶⁵ González & Varney, *supra* note 21.

⁶⁶ ZVOBGO, *supra* note 33; Kelebogile Zvobgo, *Demanding Truth: The Global Transitional Justice Network and the Creation of Truth Commissions*, 64 INT'L STUD. Q. 609 (2020).

⁶⁷ Light & Young, *supra* note 47, at 238-39.

⁶⁸ Burch-Brown, *supra* note 64.

⁶⁹ Light & Young, *supra* note 47.

⁷⁰ Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz, *supra* note 48. *The Apartheid Museum's Genesis*, <https://www.apartheidmuseum.org/about-the-museum#:~:text=The%20cost%20of%20the%20construction,which%20is%20Dr%20John%20Kani>.

⁷¹ Light & Young, *supra* note 47, at 240-41.

⁷² Coupland, *supra* note 7.

⁷³ Burch-Brown, *supra* note 64, at 817-18.

⁷⁴ *Summary: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Final Report*, KENYA TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE NETWORK (Aug. 2013), <https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Transitional%20Justice/kenya-tjrc-summary-report-aug-2013.pdf?ver=2018-06-08-100202-027>.

⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁶ Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz, *supra* note 48.

⁷⁷ *Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada*, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF CANADA, (2015), <https://nctr.ca/records/reports/#trc-reports>

⁷⁸ As a rough translation of recommendation 45, “Construction of places of memory for LGBT segments linked to repression and resistance during the dictatorship...” *Ditadura e Homossexualidades*, BRASIL COMISSÃO NACIONAL DA VERDADE 25 (2014), http://comissaoaverdade.al.sp.gov.br/relatorio/tomo-i/downloads/I_Tomo_Parte_2_Ditadura-e-Homossexualidades-Iniciativas-da-Comissao-da-Verdade-do-Estado-de-Sao-Paulo-Rubens-Paiva.pdf. Note, “45” is the number assigned to the recommendation in our dataset. Byrne, Zerie & Zvobgo, *supra* note 22.

⁷⁹ Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz, *supra* note 48.

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ Patrizia Violi, *Trauma Site Museums and Politics of Memory: Tuol Sleng, Villa Grimaldi and the Bologna Ustica Museum*, 29 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 36 (2012).

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⁸³ Jelin, *supra* note 36, at 142.

⁸⁴ Gurler & Ozer, *supra* note 82, at 859-60.

⁸⁵ *Id.* at 862.

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⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁸⁸ Mayo, *supra* note 43, at 63-4.

⁸⁹ Violi, *supra* note 81, at 39.

⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁹¹ Stephanie N. Arel, *The Power of Place: Trauma Recovery and Memorialization*, 4 STELLENBOSCH THEOLOGICAL J. 16 (2018).

⁹² Jelin, *supra* note 36, at 146-51.

⁹³ Violi, *supra* note 81, at 39; Arel *supra* note 91, at 24-25.

⁹⁴ Arel *supra* note 91 at 17.

⁹⁵ *Id.*

⁹⁶ For an example of memorialization at grave sites, see descriptions of Mayan mourning rituals at mass graves in Guatemala. Virginia Garrard-Burnett, *Living with Ghosts: Death, Exhumation, and Reburial among the Maya in Guatemala*, LATIN AMERICAN PERSP. (2015).

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¹⁰⁰ Fiona Cameron, *Transcending Fear-Engaging Emotions and Opinion—A Case for Museums in the 21st Century*, 6 OPEN MUSEUM J. 1 (2003).

¹⁰¹ Willard L. Boyd, *Museums as Centers of Controversy*, 128 DAEDALUS 185 (1999); Neil Harris, *Museums and Controversy: Some Introductory Reflections*, 82 J. AM. HIST. 1113 (1995); Patricia Davison, *Museums and the Re-Shaping of Memory*, in NEGOTIATING THE PAST: THE MAKING OF MEMORY IN SOUTH AFRICA 144 (Sarah Nuttall & Carli Coetzee eds., 1998).

¹⁰² Richard Sandell, *Museums and the Human Rights Frame*, in MUSEUMS, EQUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 207 (Richard Sandell & Eithne Nightingale eds., 2012).

¹⁰³ Thomas Woods, *Museums and the Public: Doing History Together*, 82 J. AM. HIST. 1111, 1113 (1995).

¹⁰⁴ Boyd, *supra* note 101, at 187.

¹⁰⁵ *Dario Acevedo Resigns from the Direction of the National Center for Historical Memory*, EL ESPECTADOR (July 7, 2022), <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/dario-acevedo-renuncia-al-centro-nacional-de-memoria-historica/> [<https://perma.cc/JXX4-CT6B>].

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

¹⁰⁷ Davison, *supra* note 101, at 145-58; Gellman & Bellino, *supra* note 40, at 6.

¹⁰⁸ TEACHABLE MONUMENTS: USING PUBLIC ART TO SPARK DIALOGUE AND CONFRONT CONTROVERSY 6 (Sierra Rooney, Jennifer Wingate & Harriet F. Senie eds., 2021).

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

¹¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² ROBERT S. NELSON & MARGARET OLIN, MONUMENTS AND MEMORY, MADE AND UNMADE (2003).

¹¹³ TEACHABLE MONUMENTS, *supra* note 108, at 16.

¹¹⁴ *Id.*

¹¹⁵ Mneesha Gellman, *No Justice, No Peace? National Reconciliation and Local Conflict Resolution in Cambodia*, 32 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 37 (2008).

¹¹⁶ WARWICK FROST & JENNIFER LAING, COMMEMORATIVE EVENTS: MEMORY, IDENTITIES, CONFLICT (2013).

¹¹⁷ MICHAEL A. DI GIOVINE, THE HERITAGE-SCAPE: UNESCO, WORLD HERITAGE, AND TOURISM 10 (2008).

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¹¹⁹ Brian L. VanBlarcom & Cevat Kayahan, *Assessing the Economic Impact of a UNESCO World Heritage Designation*, 6 J. HERITAGE TOURISM 143 (2011).

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¹²¹ *Id.* at 63-76.

¹²² ZVOBGO, *supra* note 33.

¹²³ Research shows that there is not substantial variation between the general types of recommendations made by post-conflict and post-autocratic commissions. ZVOBGO, *supra* note 33.

¹²⁴ Where do recommendations come from? Recommendations are the product of victim testimony, civil society suggestions, and truth commission officials’ own initiative.

¹²⁵ ZVOBGO, *supra* note 33.

¹²⁶ Byrne et al., *supra* note 22.

¹²⁷ As a rough translation of recommendation 130, “To remind its citizens of the tragedies in the country, Côte d'Ivoire could build a national memorial and regional memorials. The national memorial would be both a museum of the horrors of war and a receptacle for all available data on the Ivorian crises. It is about making public and accessible the information collected and stored in what will become the place of memory of the Ivorian Nation. This memorial will be characterized by an original architecture which is striking for its symbolic relationship to the crisis.” Rapport Final: Commission Dialogue, Verite et Reconciliation, RÉPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D’IVOIRE (2014), 120, https://www.gouv.ci/doc/presse/1477497207RAPPORT%20FINAL_CDVR.pdf. Note, “130” is the number assigned to the recommendation in our dataset. Byrne et al., *supra* note 22.

¹²⁸ *Côte d’Ivoire : conseil des ministres du 05 août 2020 (Le Communiqué)*, OUESTAFNEWS, (2020), <https://www.ouestaf.com/cote-divoire-conseil-des-ministres-du-05-aout-2020-le-communiqué/>.

¹²⁹ As a rough translation of recommendation 200, “The Enquete Commission welcomes the plans of the State of Berlin to erect a memorial to honor the victims of June 17, 1953, and in particular the willingness of the federal government to participate, also financially, in this national task. The commission regards the former House of Ministries on Leipzigerstrasse / Wilhelmstrasse (in future the seat of the Federal Ministry of Finance) in Berlin as a place of outstanding importance for a memorial to commemorate the popular uprising of June 17. A memorial at this location should be supplemented by an information and documentation center that is scientifically based and demonstrates the diversity and breadth of the popular uprising of June 17, 1953 in the whole of the GDR.” DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, MATERIALIEN DER ENQUETE-KOMMISSION ‘ÜBERWINDUNG DER FOLGEN DER SED-DIKTATUR IM PROZEß DER DEUTSCHEN EINHEIT’ (13. WAHLPERIODE DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES) (1999), 642-43. Note, “200” is the number assigned to the recommendation

in our dataset. Byrne et al., *supra* note 22. For more on post-truth commission memory production in Germany, see Andrew H. Beattie, *An Evolutionary Process: Contributions of the Bundestag Inquiries into East Germany to an Understanding of the Role of Truth Commissions*, 3 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST 229 (2009).

¹³⁰ *Memorial to the 17 June 1953 Uprising*, <https://www.visitberlin.de/en/memorial-17-june-1953-uprising>.

¹³¹ COMMISSION POUR LA RECONCILIATION NATIONALE, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION DE RÉCONCILIATION NATIONALE 35 (1999).

¹³² Mathieu Hilgers, *Evolution of Political Regime and Popular Political Representations in Burkina Faso*, 6 AFR. J. POL. SCI. 1, 4-5 (2012).

¹³³ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Witness to Truth: Volume Two, Chapter Three, Recommendations* (2004), 180 <https://www.sierraleonetr.com/index.php/view-the-final-report/download-table-of-contents/volume-two/item/witness-to-the-truth-volume-two-chapter-3> [<https://perma.cc/4YQ6-ZPPL>].

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ ZVOBGO, *supra* note 33.

¹³⁶ *Id.*

¹³⁷ Byrne et al., *supra* note 22.

¹³⁸ Nicole Winchester, *Targeting Culture: The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Conflict*, HOUSE OF LORDS LIBRARY (2022) <https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/targeting-culture-the-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-in-conflict/>.

¹³⁹ Light & Young, *supra* note 47, at 238-39.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*

¹⁴¹ Joshua Zeitz, *Why There Are No Nazi Statues in Germany*, POLITICO (2017) <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/20/why-there-are-no-nazi-statues-in-germany-215510/>

¹⁴² Amanda Erickson, *How Other Countries Have Dealt with Monuments to Dictators, Fascists and Racists*, THE WASHINGTON POST (2017) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/15/how-other-countries-have-dealt-with-monuments-to-dictators-fascists-and-racists/>

¹⁴³ See Table 2.

¹⁴⁴ Burch-Brown, *supra* note 64.

¹⁴⁵ See Table 2.

¹⁴⁶ See *Id.*

¹⁴⁷ Patrick Boylan, *Running A Museum: A Practical Handbook*, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS (2004), <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000141067>; Christine Burton & Carol Scott, *Museums: Challenges for the 21st Century*, in MUSEUM MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING 49 (Richard Sandell & Robert R. Janes eds., 2007).

¹⁴⁸ *Monument to Absence, Mexico City, Mexico*, CONTESTED HISTORIES (2012), 8 https://contestedhistories.org/wp-content/uploads/Mexico_-_Monument-to-Absence-in-Mexico-City..pdf [<https://perma.cc/HEQ6-U2NS>].

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ See Table 2.

¹⁵¹ See Table 3.

¹⁵² See Table 4.

¹⁵³ See Table 5.

¹⁵⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵⁵ *Id.*

¹⁵⁶ See Table 6.

¹⁵⁷ *Id.*

¹⁵⁸ *Id.*

¹⁵⁹ *Id.*

¹⁶⁰ Colleen Murphy & Kelebogile Zvobgo, *Transitional Justice for Historical Injustice*, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 422 (Cheryl Lawther & Luke Moffett eds., 2023).

¹⁶¹ *Id.*

¹⁶² *Id.*

¹⁶³ Daniel Posthumus & Kelebogile Zvobgo, *Democratizing Truth: An Analysis of Truth Commissions in the United States*, 15 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 510 (2021).